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Abstract 
Marissa Ingalls ―Missing: A Common Energy Policy for Europe‖ 
(Under the direction of Graeme Robertson) 
 
This paper will examine European integration from a rational choice institutionalist 
perspective and the development of energy policies in order to understand aspects of policy 
issues that the European Union currently faces.  It argues that the diversity of the energy 
environment between member states has limited areas of common ground on which energy 
policies can be built during the decision making process.  The paper will define concepts of 
institutional theory, European integration, and decision making among the member states.  
This will be followed by sections on energy policy, the importance of natural gas and oil at 
the national level and why there is limited policy coordination and cooperation among the 
member states, and the influence of non-European Union countries, particularly Russia, on 
European energy policies. The paper will conclude with a reflection on the future of a 
European energy policy and the process of integration. 
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1.0 Introduction 
The integration of the European Union institutions over its nearly 60 year history has 
gone further than any other regional or international body currently in existence. The nature 
of the European Union makes it difficult to classify, described often as an international 
organization with the characteristics of a federal state (Jupille and Caporaso, 1996; Dowding, 
2000; Jachtenfuchs, 2002), but there is little doubt of its legitimacy on the world stage.  The 
member states have traded national policy making autonomy for economic gains and, for 
some, a stronger political voice. This has normalized high levels of cooperation among the 
member states at a supranational level in ways that other international organizations cannot 
attest to. Representatives from every member state have a mandated presence in the 
bureaucracy of the European Union and heads of state and government meet at least four 
times every year during Presidency summits.  The European Union is a unique institutional 
mechanism that generates supranational policies on a regular basis after every member state 
has given their approval and institutional theory has provided great insight into how 
integration has been possible.   
The deepest levels of integration can be found in economic policies concerning the 
Single European Market and the European Union is considered to be at its strongest in terms 
of economic issues. Economic issues make up the majority of the acquis communitaire – the 
body of legislation enforced by the European Union – and market regulatory measures are 
some of the strongest tools of the institutions in every day practice.  However, complete 
policy competency has yet to be attained in all areas.  The gas crises of 2007 and again in 
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January 2009 have highlighted the need among European Union member states to develop 
market mechanisms, a supranational network of energy regulators, and promote new energy 
technologies for increasing the security of energy supply (Commission of the European 
Communities, 2009a).  While all of these areas and more have been identified as necessary 
for reform, a number of obstacles have hindered the development of a supranational energy 
policy. This paper will focus on energy policies to understand why greater degrees of 
integration, manifested in supranational policies created by the European Union rather than 
national governments, have not occurred in this vital and sometimes politically charged 
economic sector. 
This paper will incorporate past study of European integration from a rational choice 
institutionalist perspective with current debates on the development of energy policies in 
order to understand aspects of policy issues and deeper integration that the European Union 
faces today.  The institutions involved in the European integration process have been in place 
for a considerable amount of time, but the European Union still lacks the authority found in 
federal systems of government.  This paper argues that the diversity of the energy 
environment between member states has limited areas of common ground on which energy 
policies can be built during the decision making process.  It will begin by defining concepts 
of institutional theory as it relates to the European Union, integration, and decision making 
among the member states.  This will be followed by a section on energy policy; what it 
encompasses in practical terms and the current state of the European Union Energy Policy.  
The paper will go on to describe the importance of natural gas and oil at the national level 
and why there is limited policy coordination and cooperation among the member states.  The 
next section will examine the influence of non-European Union countries, particularly 
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Russia, on European energy policies. The paper will conclude with a reflection on the future 
of a European energy policy and the process of integration. 
  
 
 
2.0 Institutionalism and the European Union 
 The integration of the European Union has been studied by academics from several 
different theoretical perspectives as it has developed from the European Coal and Steel 
Community of 1951 to what it consists of today.  Relationships between the member states 
and motivations for cooperation can also be described by theories of international relations. 
This study focuses on institutionalism for several reasons.  The key players involved are the 
27 member states of the European Union and the European Union itself, which will be 
considered as unitary actors.  This classification is commonly understood as a 27 plus one 
configuration
1
. This group of countries and supranational body are a particularly good 
subject because the European Union formal institutions are easily recognized and have 
clearly delineated procedural rules and decision making competency.  The institutions and 
long history of European integration also means that member states are used to consulting 
one another and coordinating policy decisions at national and, ultimately, supranational 
levels.  This regular interaction and high degree of legitimacy makes the European Union a 
unique international organization as it has the ability to create supranational legislation and 
direct policy agendas in a very concrete way.   
2.1 Theories of European Integration 
 The integration of European countries into what is now the European Union began in 
1950 with the formation of the European Coal and Steel Community between France, 
                                                            
1 The 27+1 configuration typically describes representations at European Union summits or other meetings of 
international organizations.  All 27 member states must be represented individually and the European Union is 
generally represented by a member of the Commission. 
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Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, and Italy.  These six founding countries 
then moved on seven years later to form the original supranational bodies of the European 
Economic Community, which would eventually become the European Union institutions as 
they are known today with 27 member states.  Theories of integration have largely been 
based on the European experience and trends in integration studies have closely followed 
trends in European integration.  During the early years, neofunctionalist theories attributed to 
Ernst Haas focused on spillover effects as sectoral policy areas were integrated under central 
authorities, pressuring neighboring policies to be placed under the same authority.  These 
were the unintended consequences of integration, paralleled by political spillover as sectoral 
interest groups shifted loyalty preferences from national governments to the new centralized 
authority. During the years of Euro-sclerosis
2
 in the 1960s and 1970s, Stanley Hoffmann‘s 
intergovernmentalist theories proudly proclaimed the resilience of the nation state as 
additional transfers of sovereignty were severely limited and the executive body of European 
Community, the Commission, was politically weakened.  Neofunctionalism was revived in 
the 1980s with the success of the Delors Commission, but Andrew Moravcsik and his 
theories of liberal intergovernmentalism soon challenged the integration enthusiasm.  
Moravcsik describes a three step decision making process of national preference formation, 
bargaining influenced by the relative power of individual actors and side deals, and 
commitment to institutional solutions as a credibility booster (Pollack, 2005).  
                                                            
2 Euro-sclerosis refers to the period from 1958 to 1972 when little change took place in the European Economic 
Community.  Most notably, Charles de Gaulle prevented expanding the Community to include the United 
Kingdom, and subsequently Ireland and Denmark, in his capacity as French president by voting against their 
membership application twice.  De Gaulle also recalled French representative from the Council for seven 
months, effectively crippling decision making of any sort, until the Luxembourg compromise was agreed upon 
in 1966 to allow unanimity votes when ―major interests‖ are being discussed.  More information on the history 
of the European Union can be found at the official European Union website: 
http://europa.eu/abc/history/index_en.htm 
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Institutional theories have emerged in three prominent forms – rational choice 
institutionalism, historical institutionalism, and sociological institutionalism – since the 
1990s and are primarily concerned with the process of decision making, often with less 
emphasis on integration as an outcome. Valuable insight into integration can be gained from 
the theoretical assumptions of all three branches, but this paper will focus on the assumptions 
of rational choice institutionalism.  The decision making process in the European Union is 
important to both institutionalist and integration theories as different policy areas have 
different procedural rules associated with them.  European Union institutions utilize 
unanimity or qualified majority voting depending on the issue under discussion, and are also 
able to make recommendations or other non-binding decisions.  Since the adoption of the 
Lisbon Treaty, energy measures fall under the ordinary legislative procedure, formerly 
known as the codecision procedure (Fondation Robert Schuman, 2007; Publications Office of 
the European Union, 2008).  This procedure describes a process of legislative proposals and 
multiple readings between the Commission, the Council and the European Parliament.  
Ultimately, the Council makes the final decision to adopt new legislation, which must be 
done by unanimity if three readings are taken before agreement can be reached.  The standard 
informal preference to adopt new legislation is to reach consensus rather than use qualified 
majority voting rules (Börzel, 2005).  This means that every actor must agree to a policy 
before it is adopted as official legislation.  National energy policy preferences are very 
diverse, as will be demonstrated by this paper, thus making common ground difficult to find 
during decision making even if prominent countries like France and Germany push for policy 
development. 
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2.1 Institutions Matter 
 Rational choice institutionalist theories within political science have a similar starting 
point to realist theories; states are treated as rational, unitary actors and cooperation can only 
take place if significant common interests exist.  Institutionalism expects governments to 
construct institutions when benefits from cooperation are clearly attainable.  Institutions – 
like NATO, the World Trade Organization, and the European Union – ―can provide 
information, reduce transaction costs, make commitments more credible, establish focal 
points for coordination, and in general facilitate the operation of reciprocity‖ (Keohane and 
Martin, 1995).  It is important to understand that institutions have an interactive effect, 
meaning that their impact depends on circumstances of power and interests.  Functioning 
institutions work because of reciprocity.  The negotiations of member states in the European 
Union often appears to be based on bargaining and horse trading before any deals are made 
or announced publicly.  The institutions not only provide a forum for discussion, they also 
facilitate information sharing and greater transparency during negotiations.  In this sense, 
mutual benefits are more easily recognized and priorities of national governments can align 
(Jervis, 1999).  Again for the European Union, integration means member states give up 
degrees of policy making autonomy so that a more efficient supranational entity is 
responsible for ensuring the good of all.  The Single European Market is a concrete example 
of how member states benefit from unified economic policies and common agreements.  This 
policy convergence between member states deepens integration and is a result of the decision 
making process that happens within the European Union institutions. 
 As a branch of realist theories, institutionalism expects a similar process of preference 
formation and bargaining between actors before an outcome is decided upon, but with a 
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slightly different bargaining environment.  Actors, in this case the member states of the 
European Union, form preferences based on how a policy could impact domestic conditions.  
In terms of energy policies, domestic conditions would include types of national energy 
production, the balance between the import and export of energy, how national consumption 
is expected to change in the future, and many other factors.  Once preferences are formed, 
actors gather to negotiate possible policy outcomes and/or set a broad agenda related to the 
issue under discussion.  The bargaining step is very important in institutional theories 
because decision making and ―politics occurs within a framework of mutually understood 
principles, norms, rules, or procedures that is, within an institutional context‖ (Jupille and 
Caporaso, 1999). Actor behavior is driven by calculations, which is influenced by 
assumptions of how other actors will act.  The institutional context limits the range of 
possible actions, as well as provides information and enforcement mechanisms that reduce 
uncertainty about what other actors will do (Hall and Taylor, 1996).  The institutions of the 
European Union have been in place for a considerable amount of time and actors regularly 
interact within this framework.  A great deal of information is exchanged between actors that 
influence strategic calculations during the decision making and bargaining process.  While 
the institutions may be perceived as an independent variable on policy outcomes in some 
cases in the past, this has not proven to be true with regard to energy policy.  The European 
Union acts only as an intervening variable (Aspinwall and Schneider, 2001) to structure 
bargaining between the member states, with no power to alter national preferences. 
Institutions do have the potential to equalize power relations between actors, and ―in the 
European Union this means that the decision-making process can alter the relative influence 
of the different actors‖ (Kerremans, 1996).  However, concessions made by actors can be 
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motivated by side deals on other policy issues or as the result of pressure from other actors, 
rather than because each actor feels equally represented.  National preferences still dominate 
energy issues and the European Union energy policy reflects this. 
 Under the assumptions of institutionalism, participating actors should identify 
common interests among their national preferences and use existing institutions, or create 
new ones, to address the issue at hand, thus deepening integration.  With regard to energy 
policy, common interests among member states have been identified by the European 
Commission in terms of sustainability, ensuring security of supply, and competitiveness 
(Commission of the European Communities, 2007), all of which will be discussed at length 
in later sections.  The identification of these interests at a common level is the first step 
towards greater cooperation. The means to address these interests exist within the 
mechanisms of the European Union institutions, both by supranational bodies and by 
legislative procedure.  Using such institutional mechanisms, whether to create new 
legislation for an Internal Energy Market or to standardize technical reporting of information, 
should be the second step in the integration process. This has occurred with the case of 
climate change and green house gas emission regulation in the form of a cap and trade 
mechanism, the European Union Emission Trading System, in place since 2005
3
. However, 
diverse national priorities in energy sectors and other obstacles mean that supranational 
cooperation on energy policies has been more of a dream than a reality in everyday practice.  
The remainder of this paper will provide insight into why this is the case. 
  
                                                            
3 Additional information about the Emission Trading System (ETS) can be found at the official European Union 
website: http://ec.europa.eu/environment/climat/emission/index_en.htm 
 
 
3.0 Define Energy Policy 
 Energy policies address the production, consumption and distribution of energy.  This 
means that policies are concerned with resources like coal, natural gas, and oil; nuclear 
power plants; electricity; and alternative or renewable energy sources such as biodiesel, 
wind, hydro, and solar power.  Additionally, the European Commission has decided to link 
energy policies with environmental concerns about greenhouse gas emissions, thus putting 
pressure on national governments to increase energy efficiency and reduce emissions. The 
creation of the Emissions Trading System was seen as a major step forward in addressing 
climate change as it utilizes market mechanisms and is meant to be business friendly (Rapid 
Press Release, 2005). The member states of the European Union have an opportunity to 
develop policies that address energy issues and incentives for doing so at a supranational 
level.  The oil crisis of 1973 and the Russia/Ukraine gas crises of 2007 and 2009 
demonstrated the vulnerability of European countries to market failures and political 
maneuvering.  The 1973 oil crisis helped trigger a period of stagnation in terms of deepening 
integration among European Union members, while the 2007 and 2009 gas crises were 
followed by calls for greater degrees of coordination in order to ensure the security of 
supplies to member states.  This paper is most interested in how policies address natural gas 
and oil, and how individual member states incorporate these resources in their domestic 
energy portfolios in light of, or in spite of, agendas set by the European Commission.  Before 
elaborating on national differences, the paper will first discuss the European Union‘s vision 
for a European energy policy. 
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3.1 European Union Priorities 
 The European Commission has published several communications on the future of 
energy policy. The greatest concerns that they have identified are sustainability, ensuring 
security of supply, and competitiveness.  The Commission has also given great precedence to 
reducing greenhouse gas emissions by 20 percent by 2020 – in line with commitments made 
by European countries according to the Kyoto protocol – and that a European Energy Policy 
should have this goal at the center of its objectives (Commission, 2007).   
These concerns appear to be relatively straightforward, but concrete policy actions are 
vague and incomplete, calling for nothing short of a new industrial revolution.  The 2007 
communication outlines goals for an Internal Energy Market for the European Union, again 
relying on market mechanisms to address the three major concerns and reduce emissions by 
focusing on unbundling, regulation, transparency, infrastructure, network security, and 
adequacy of electricity generation and gas supply.  Unbundling would ideally be in terms of 
company ownership; network companies would not be supply and generation companies.  
Regulatory measures would harmonize the powers of national energy regulators, or create an 
independent European energy regulator, as well as harmonizing technical standards between 
the member states.  Technical standards are linked to the need for transparency as member 
states do not report energy statistics equally, thereby limiting available information about the 
market and decreasing competitiveness in European markets.  The last three aspects – 
infrastructure, network security and adequacy of generation and supply – are inevitably 
linked to one another. Natural gas is closely tied to electricity markets due to gas-fueled 
production plants, and both resources are limited by fragmented infrastructure and low 
demand elasticity in the market (Röller et al, 2007).  Infrastructure investments are important 
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not only for natural gas and oil pipelines, but also for electricity grids.  Connecting and 
expanding existing infrastructure opens national energy markets and allows member states to 
access supplies from multiple sources if natural gas and oil transit or electricity generation is 
disrupted. 
Emergency meetings held by the Commission, along with the Czech Presidency, 
during the 2009 Russia/Ukraine gas crisis of the Gas Coordination Group, the European Gas 
Industry, the European Gas Transmission Operators, the Network of Energy Security 
Correspondents, representatives of Gazprom and Naftogaz, along with Russian and 
Ukrainian government officials demonstrated that the European Union can coordinate 
emergency responses, greater information sharing  and create solutions at the most efficient 
and effective level (Commission, 2009a).  This period also shed light on the inefficiencies of 
current market responses – the greatest tool of the European Union – and the many problems 
listed above that must be addressed before an Internal Energy Market becomes a reality. 
While infrastructure development, increasing investment into renewable resources, and 
unbundling control of energy production and distribution are high priorities of the 
Commission, national energy markets remain fragmented from one another for many 
reasons.  National energy needs and preferences are addressed most effectively and 
efficiently by national governments, rather than by the Commission, which explains 
limitations in the bargaining process at a supranational level.  The exception is climate 
change and the regulation of green house gas emissions.  Common ground is possible on this 
issue as all member states experience the effects of climate change and a collective solution 
meets the requirements the Kyoto Protocol.  In this way, the Emission Trading System 
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upholds international commitments through the implementation of a regional mechanism.  
Unfortunately, natural gas and oil policies cannot be unified in the same manner.  
  
  
4.0 Limiting integration: Natural gas and oil 
 While there is a general consensus that all European Union member states are 
vulnerable to energy insecurities, several economic and political factors exist that prevent 
greater degrees of cooperation and coordination from happening at a supranational level.  To 
understand why the European Union does not have a common Energy Policy or an Internal 
Energy Market, it is important to examine multiple aspects of natural gas and oil.  These two 
resources are affected by the fewest number of legislative decisions out of all energy related 
regulations, directives, resolutions and recommendations made by the European Union 
institutions (EUR-Lex, 2010). Natural gas and oil have a long history in terms of energy 
production and consumption in European energy portfolios.  Beyond Europe, both resources 
are in high demand globally, with consumption of natural gas in China nearly matching that 
of Germany, the second highest consumer in the European Union after the United Kingdom, 
in 2008
4
.  China, Japan, and India have all surpassed German consumption of oil for 2008, 
and Chinese consumption was over three times that of Germany
5
. Security of supply for 
European Union members is important as they must compete for resources internationally, 
thus adding an external, foreign policy element to broader economic energy policies. 
This section will examine national concerns in terms of levels of consumption and 
production, sources and the diversity of resource supplies, variation among member states in 
                                                            
4 China consumed 80.7 billion cubic meters (bcm) of natural gas for 2008.  Germany and the United Kingdom 
consumed 82.0 bcm and 93.9 bcm respectively.  BP Statistical Review of World Energy, 2009. 
 
5 China consumed 375.5 million tons of oil for 2008.  Japan consumed 221.8 million tons, India consumed 
135.0 million tons, and Germany consumed 118.3 million tons of oil.  BP Statistical Review, 2009.  
Calculations own. 
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terms of risk assessments, and general energy priorities.  These four mechanisms are not 
adequately addressed by any tools of the European Union as energy is not included in the 
Single European Market and market mechanisms are insufficient for dealing with energy 
crises at this time.  There is also a disparity between natural gas and oil in terms of the 
previously identified variables as oil markets are considered to be global and therefore less 
volatile than natural gas markets, which remain largely regional and dependent on pipeline 
infrastructure.  The following subsections will shed light on why this is the case and what the 
policy implications are for member states and for the European Union as a whole. 
4.1 Consumption and Production: Energy Intensity 
 Each member state of the European Union consumes and produces different amounts 
of natural gas and oil.  The relationship between national consumption and production is 
called energy intensity and is a typical variable taken into consideration by academic studies 
on energy.  Energy intensity can indicate potential socio-economic distortion in the case of 
supply disruption (Pointvogl, 2009), levels of import dependency (Le Coq and Paltseva, 
2009), and effectiveness of energy in producing added value (Commission, 2009b).  Import 
dependency is the amount of energy resources imported by countries to supplement 
consumption levels and is measured as the percentage of net imports divided by gross 
consumption.  Although many countries produce both natural gas and oil or at least one of 
these resources, nearly all of the member states must rely on imports to make up for national 
consumption levels.  Only Denmark remains the exception as a net exporter of both natural 
gas and oil.  However, Denmark has low ratios of proved reserves to production levels for 
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both resources
6
 and can be expected to join the rest of the European Union countries as a net 
importer within 10 years if production remains at 2008 levels. 
 Energy intensity figures have decreased for the European Union 27 member states 
collectively since 1996, but import dependency has increased.  This trend is not completely 
consistent when figures are disaggregated to the national level.  In line with the aggregate 
data, Ireland reduced its energy intensity from 196 Mtoe/M€7 in 1990 to 107 Mtoe/M€ in 
2006, and import dependency increased from 69.1 percent to 90.9 percent over the same 
amount of time.  Spain has made little progress in reducing energy intensity, from 188 
Mtoe/M€ in 1990 to 187 Mtoe/M€ in 2006.  Energy intensity actually rose until 1995 before 
decreasing gradually to 2006 levels.  Import dependency in Spain has increased over the 16 
year period.  In Romania, both energy intensity and import dependency figures have 
decreased since 1990, although increases have occurred over that time.  However, Romania‘s 
import dependency for 2006 is much lower than both Ireland and Spain at 29.1 percent.  
Poland‘s import dependency has increased since 1990, but it remains on the low end at 19.9 
percent
8
 compared to other European Union countries. 
 These figures only paint part of the energy picture for the European Union member 
states and are also slightly deceiving.  Energy intensity figures, as reported by the 
Directorate-General for Energy and Transport in 2009, are measured as a million tons of oil 
equivalent used per million Euros and the consumption and production of natural gas and oil 
are only a part of overall national figures.  Total energy consumption across Europe grew at a 
                                                            
6 Reserves-to-production (R/P) ratio of 5.5 for natural gas and 7.7 for oil in 2008.  ―If the reserves remaining at 
the end of the year are divided by the production in that year, the result is the length of time that those 
remaining reserves would last if production were to continue at that rate.‖ BP Statistical Review, 2009. 
 
7 Mtoe/M€: Million tons of oil equivalent used per million Euros. 
8 Figures taken from EU Energy in Figures 2009, published by the Directorate-General for Energy and 
Transport (DG-TREN) of the European Commission. 
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smaller rate than total gross domestic product over time, which reflects the lower energy 
intensity levels.  Additionally, energy efficiency has increased due to improvements in 
infrastructure, the development of new technologies, and market shifts away from 
manufacturing, which consume greater amounts of energy than services.  Energy 
consumption levels are still increasing in European Union member states and import 
dependency, although clearly unequal, also continues to increase as a general trend.  This 
makes the entire European Union vulnerable as energy consumption levels continue to 
increase and energy production must often be supplemented by imports. 
4.2 Sources 
 Where natural gas and oil come from is an important part of supply security.  
Currently, Russia and Norway export the largest percentages of natural gas and oil to the 
European Union as a whole.  Libya rounds out the top three for oil and Algeria accounts for 
gas.  Collectively, the 27 member states imported 60.8 percent of natural gas and 87.3 
percent of oil in 2006 (Commission, 2009b) and consumption levels are expected to increase 
through 2030.  However, natural gas and oil is not distributed to all member states from 
every source country equally and distribution is dependent to a large extent on infrastructure 
restrictions, particularly for gas.  Pipelines from Russia cross through Belarus and Ukraine 
before connecting with other Eastern and Central European countries.  Some supplies of 
natural gas and oil from the Caucasus and the Middle East are transited by pipeline and via 
shipping tankers.  A few countries, such as Qatar, also ship natural gas in liquefied form – 
liquefied natural gas (LNG) – which compresses the gas and allows for greater quantities of 
supplies to be transported. While shipping LNG overseas is a viable alternative to pipeline 
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distribution, there are a limited number of receiving terminals in European Union countries 
and inland distribution depends on overland infrastructure, like pipelines.  
 Source diversity is important for increasing supply security and market 
competitiveness overall.  In general, countries that import supplies via pipelines are subject 
to higher transaction costs when supply origins are further away from their destinations and 
have to be transited through other countries.  Producing countries, such as Azerbaijan and 
Georgia, charge other producers that must use their pipelines to reach shipping tankers or 
consumers and costs steadily increase along with distance (Reymond, 2007).  This can make 
transporting natural gas from Turkmenistan and oil from Kazakhstan more expensive before 
it reaches European markets. Costs are dramatically lower over distance travelled for 
shipping tankers of LNG, but plans to construct additional regasification plants are only 
taking shape in Spain, the United Kingdom, France and Belgium.  Natural gas, as discussed 
earlier, is closely linked to electricity generation and electricity markets, which makes both 
gas and electricity vulnerable to supply disruption.  National energy generation depends on a 
variety of resources beyond natural gas and oil and the diversity of forms of energy used – 
such as coal, nuclear, hydro, solar, and other renewables – also reflects on overall security 
and market competitiveness (Meritet, 2007).  The importance of source diversity, not only for 
imports but also for national energy generation, will be explored more fully in the discussion 
of risk assessments. 
 Natural gas and oil will not be replaced by renewable sources or nuclear power plants 
as key sources for energy production within the near future.  It is therefore vital that energy 
supplies for future consumption be assured.  Unfortunately, many proved reserves are 
increasingly in regions with limited political stability or in environmentally sensitive areas, 
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such as the Arctic Circle or other offshore locations.  This makes future development for 
drilling technically difficult and financially risky.  The political risk of supply sources will be 
discussed further in the remainder of this section and in the assessment of non-European 
influences. 
4.3 Risk Assessment 
 There are clear differences between the amount of risk each European Union country 
faces in terms of natural gas and oil.  High or low degrees of risk are also not consistent 
within countries for each resource.  Risk can be associated with energy transit, political risks 
of supplying countries, diversification of imports, and the economic impact of supply 
disruption (Le Coq and Paltseva, 2009).  The security of external supplies (i.e. imports) of 
natural gas and oil is important to meet European consumption demands economically, and 
for political objectives.  As will be discussed in the fifth section, member states of the 
European Union are limited in their production capacities and thus largely rely on non-
European Union countries for natural gas and oil supplies.  Due to current pipeline 
infrastructure, many central and eastern European countries also depend on the transit of 
natural gas and oil through Belarus and Ukraine, which is what made the 2007 and 2009 gas 
crises have such a widespread impact.  Energy companies typically receive significant 
government support and many governments own large shares of stocks in their national 
champions (Pointvogl, 2009).  Political stability is necessary for supply security and political 
pressures regularly influence investment, transit, or other negotiations. In this way, political 
and economic issues are closely intertwined when it comes to energy policies and political 
relations are important for supply security. 
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 Le Coq and Paltseva compiled detailed risk assessment indexes, using data from 
2006, for 24 of the 27 European Union member states in terms of national risk and as a 
contribution to EU-level risk exposure
9
.  This study goes beyond understanding production 
and consumption and source diversity among the member states.  The risk assessment 
provides a more complete picture of how different energy practices at the national level 
impact national goals and why coordination on natural gas and oil is ultimately limited at a 
supranational level. Any supranational policy created by the European Union would need to 
account for the very different energy portfolios of the member states and the authors suggest 
using a sectoral approach for future policy development.  Le Coq and Paltseva incorporate 
data on energy use, information on supplier countries, political risk, and the distance between 
supplier and consuming countries.  While the authors created indexes for natural gas, oil, and 
coal, only natural gas and oil figures will be reported in this paper. 
 Not only are European Union member states different in terms of energy intensity, 
import dependency and energy diversity, they also differ in terms of risk for each resource 
and as a contribution to the European Union as a whole.  Le Coq and Paltseva divide the 
member states into three different categories in the gas index; high, medium and low risk.  
There are eight high risk countries, including Austria, Hungary, and Romania, which do not 
produce their own gas, instead relying on imports from Norway and non-European Union 
countries.  Gas as a share of total energy consumption is also high and external supplies are 
not well diversified.  Ten medium risk countries have better diversified external supplies 
and/or less reliance as a part of total energy consumption.  The low risk countries mainly 
produce their own gas or import only from European Union suppliers, thus decreasing 
                                                            
9 Risky External Energy Supply (REES) and Contribution to EU Risk Exposure (CERE) indexes are reproduced 
in original form under Tables. Malta, Cyprus, and Luxembourg were excluded due to incomplete or unavailable 
data necessary for the authors‘ calculations.  
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political risk and the distance between suppliers and consumers.  Le Coq and Paltseva point 
out that supply of LNG in a country‘s energy portfolio is not necessarily associated with 
lower risk.  Indeed, Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain are all identified as medium risk 
countries as well as LNG consumers.  Out of the sample overall, Germany, Italy, and Spain 
are high contributors to European Union risk exposure due to high natural gas consumption 
levels and Hungary and Slovakia are also high because of almost total reliance on non-
European Union suppliers. 
 Results for the oil index have some overlap with the gas index, but oil is much less 
risky due to a more globalized oil market.  This means that variation in risk levels associated 
with consumption is smaller for oil than for gas, resulting in lower risk level figures overall.  
The sample countries are once again divided into three groups.  Five countries – Bulgaria, 
Greece, Hungary, Lithuania, and Slovakia – are in the high risk group, primarily due to 
limited supply diversity.  Eleven countries are at the medium risk level, some of which have 
better diversification of oil imports, or economies that do not rely heavily on oil as a primary 
energy source.  Low risk countries, once again, have well diversified energy portfolios and/or 
their own domestic production, such as the United Kingdom and Denmark.  Spain and Italy 
are once again high contributors to European Union risk, along with other countries that are 
major oil importers. 
4.4 Energy Priorities 
 The European Union has made the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions a high 
priority for collective action, but individual member states have their own ideas when it 
comes to other energy issues.  Energy priorities for each of the member states are reflected 
by their national energy portfolios.  In other words, the different types of energy used along 
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with the production, consumption, import and export of different resources are all a part of 
the decisions that governments make when considering energy policies.  Within the last 
decade, political risk has been linked to supplies of natural gas and oil as countries that 
export to the European Union use such resources for political maneuvering and not just 
economic gains.  Russia has shut down the supply of natural gas to Ukraine as recently as 
January 2009, the effects of which spread from eastern to central European countries.  
Energy companies within the European Union also receive substantial political and economic 
backing from national governments and business concerns can heavily influence national 
policies (Pointvogl, 2009).  Nuclear energy and alternative or renewable energy sources 
furthermore have a political history due to long term environmental concerns or limited 
public investment in new technologies. 
 As an example of the complex situation the European Union member states have 
found themselves in, France is an excellent case study.  French energy priorities have some 
overlap with those of the European Union, as outlined by the 2007 Commission 
communication, but areas of its diverse energy portfolio are not accounted for by the 
prospective Internal Energy Market.  France is considered to have low risk exposure to gas 
and oil markets both nationally and as a contribution to EU-level risk.  However, France has 
higher risk exposure to oil markets than to gas for both indexes.  This goes against the overall 
trend identified by Le Coq and Paltseva.  In addition to natural gas and oil, national energy is 
produced by coal, nuclear and renewable energy plants.  Despite being an electricity net 
exporter, France also had a 51.2 percent import dependency in 2006 (Commission, 2009b).  
Given all of this evidence, France would have significantly different energy priorities 
compared to other European Union member states.  France is protective of its nuclear 
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program, while Germany and Poland are protective of their coal industries.  Unbundling and 
deregulation policies have also been unpopular among the French government, which 
traditionally has a strong influence over energy companies and the energy sector, sometimes 
causing market distortions (Meritet, 2007).  Support for supranational policies can also be 
politically risky for governments during national election periods in countries with strong 
anti-European Union sentiment, like the United Kingdom.  Strategic calculations by the 
member states are often subject to short term political time horizons rather than long term 
economic benefits.  The complexity of national energy portfolios and national politics clearly 
limit supranational bargaining. 
 
  
 
 
5.0 Outside Influences 
 The previous discussion about the importance of source diversity hinted at the 
influence of non-European Union countries on the energy policies of member states.  With 
demand and consumption by China and India rising above that of European countries, 
securing future supplies of natural gas and oil for European markets is of concern (Umbach, 
2010).  Former Soviet countries have played a greater part in global energy markets since the 
1990s as both consumers and, increasingly, as producers.  Proved reserves can be difficult to 
develop as new natural gas or oil sources and investment in pipeline or LNG infrastructure 
projects come at very high financial costs.  Pipeline construction projects are typically 
undertaken by a combination of national government and private company investment, and 
are subject to the approval of every country along the transit route.  The European Union has 
recognized that it is vulnerable to changing energy market conditions, particularly with 
natural gas markets, and a coordinated approach to external costs would benefit all member 
states.  However, non-European Union countries have the option to create their own rules for 
energy relations.  This section will look at broad energy relations between the European 
Union and countries that exercise a great amount of influence on energy policies. 
5.1 Russia 
The energy relationship between Russia and the European Union is a particularly 
sensitive one. Russia is typically portrayed as the villain of natural gas transport due to the 
2007 and 2009 disruptions of gas supplies to much of Eastern Europe and because the largest 
Russian energy company, Gazprom, is widely considered to be an extension of the Russian 
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government.  EU-Russia energy talks of the 1990s largely failed to promote competitive 
markets and Russia has yet to ratify the Energy Charter Treaty of 2007 (Noël, 2008), which 
is meant to promote transparency and efficiency among the national energy sectors of 
members.  This history lends for a politically charged atmosphere whenever energy policies 
are in question.   
Russia is the world‘s largest producer of natural gas and all of its exports are 
currently destined for European countries.  The near gas crisis during the summer of 2009, 
once again between Russia and Ukraine, put the European Union on edge as payment 
problems surfaced due to the global financial crisis.  While Eastern and Central European 
countries that rely on Russian gas were reminded of their vulnerability and lack of supply 
security, both sides have been looking for alternatives to the Ukraine and Belarus transit 
routes.  Russia currently deals with the member states of the European Union, not 
collectively, but on a bilateral basis.  This gives Gazprom a significant negotiating advantage 
for energy agreements over those countries that rely on Russian supplies (Baran, 2007; Noël, 
2008) by deliberately keeping national markets divided.   Natural gas also has low elasticity 
in the market due to limited supply sources and infrastructure fragmentation (Röller, 2007).  
The gas crisis of January 2009 was a reminder of this as Bulgaria was effectively cut off 
from receiving supplementary natural gas supplies from fellow European Union members 
due to infrastructure constraints (Commission, 2009a).  The Cold War past in Europe has 
also fostered testy relationships between former Soviet satellites, former Soviet countries and 
Russia, leaving Western countries in a tricky position in terms of Russian relations and 
further complicating European Union negotiations. 
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Russia is also dependent on European consumption levels because of its limited 
export portfolio and the costs of a highly subsidized domestic energy market.  The highly 
nationalized nature of Gazprom furthermore creates market inefficiencies, both domestically 
and with international trade partners (Baran, 2007). Russian gas is not equally distributed 
between the European Union member states, and the country is looking for ways to secure its 
share of all 27 national energy markets.  This has been complicated by natural gas pipeline 
projects backed by the European Union and specific member states that receive gas transited 
through Turkey.  The Russian government was staunchly opposed to the Baku-Tbilisi-
Ceyhan (BTC) oil pipeline and worked to undermine the project with the competing Blue 
Stream pipeline from Russia to Turkey.  The proposed Nabucco project has also been the 
subject of fierce Russian opposition.  Russia is now developing a South Stream pipeline with 
French and Italian energy companies to transport Russian gas through the Black Sea to 
Bulgaria and other European countries.   
Another pipeline, Nord Stream, is being planned to transit gas from Russia through 
the Baltic Sea and on to Germany, the largest importer of Russian natural gas (Arınç, 2007; 
Triantaphyllou, 2007).  The Nord Stream Consortium, in charge of developing the Baltic 
pipeline project, recently obtained the final clearance from Finland needed to begin 
construction.  Construction is set to take place from April 2010 to mid-2011, far ahead of the 
European Union backed Nabucco project. Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, France and 
the United Kingdom have all agreed to buy natural gas transited though Nord Stream, while 
Eastern countries like Poland, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic have expressed opposition 
based on concern for security of supplies and a lack of energy policy solidarity (Pop, 2010).  
Such pipeline politics are disruptive to the integration of an Internal Energy Market for the 
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European Union, and this is done deliberately by Russia and Gazprom as they benefit 
politically and economically from such lucrative deals. 
5.2 Caspian and Middle East 
 The countries of the Caspian and Middle East also have a significant role in European 
energy policies, particularly as alternatives to Russia.  Turkey acts as the main energy 
corridor for natural gas and oil transit from these countries to those of the European Union by 
pipeline over land and from sea ports.  The BTC oil pipeline currently links Azerbaijan, 
Georgia and Turkey and transits roughly a million barrels per day. The Nabucco pipeline for 
natural gas transit through Turkey to parts of Central Europe has been in development since 
2001, but the initial treaty on construction was only signed within the last year. Caspian 
countries have a great deal of proved reserves of natural gas that they are able to access and 
Middle Eastern countries tend to be richer in oil, but have natural gas as well.  Proper 
infrastructure for developing these reserves requires a great deal of investment, but overall 
operation and transit costs to European markets would be more cost effective than Russian 
reserves (Mavrakis, 2006).  Natural gas and oil transit is not as overtly politicized between 
European, Caspian and Middle Eastern countries as it is with the Russian national champion, 
Gazprom, but broader security concerns are present. 
Unfortunately, these countries are politically risky.  Turkey is centrally located 
between the Caspian, the Middle East, and European Union member states, thus making it an 
important player in regional energy relations.  The Turkish government has a strong 
influence on the future of energy relations and potential future projects as a major transiting 
country.  Turkmenistan currently transits gas through Iran to Armenia, and a trans-Caspian 
pipeline would link Turkmen supplies to Azerbaijan pipelines.  Iran is politically isolated 
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because of its nuclear program and domestic issues triggered by controversial national 
elections in 2009.  It does not export any natural gas even though it has the largest quantity of 
proved reserves in the Middle East due to domestic demand.  Oil reserves are also 
significantly high
10
, second only to Saudi Arabia.  Iraqi infrastructure has been poorly 
maintained and a great deal of financial investment would be needed before oil and gas 
reserves could be produced in any significant capacity.  Broader security concerns about 
corruption, terrorism, and trafficking originating in Caspian and Middle Eastern countries 
also have a great impact on any energy developments or prospective pipeline projects.  A 
good example of this is the absence of any development plans in Iraq or Afghanistan despite 
large proved reserves. The European Union and member states would benefit from investing 
financially in infrastructure projects and politically through good relations with the 
governments of such a volatile region (Paillard, 2007; Triantaphyllou, 2007).  In this case, 
energy security fits into the overall picture of foreign security and neighborhood policies for 
European Union member states.   
  
                                                            
10 Natural gas proved reserves were estimated at 29.61 trillion cubic meters and oil proved reserves at 137.6 
thousand million barrels in 2008.  BP Statistical Review, 2009. 
 
 
6.0 Conclusions 
 Rational choice institutionalism expects actors to cooperate when there are clear 
mutual benefits for doing so, specifically by developing and/or utilizing institutions that 
increase the transfer of information, add credibility to commitments and decrease transaction 
costs.  The member states of the European Union regularly interact with one another when 
new policies are developed, but energy policies have remained largely under the control of 
national governments because national preferences have a limited area of common ground.  
This paper examined natural gas and oil because of the vulnerability of national markets and 
the political link that these resources have in international relations.  The future development 
of the Internal Energy Market in the European Union is limited by the five different 
mechanisms related to natural gas and oil identified in the previous two sections: production 
and consumption levels, source diversity, risk diversity, national priorities, and the influence 
of non-European Union countries.  These mechanisms restrict necessary conditions for 
cooperation among the member states during the bargaining and decision making process, as 
well as provide clear evidence of limitations to a European Energy Policy.   
 As suggested by Le Coq and Paltseva, a sectoral approach might be the best solution 
for harmonizing the fragmented energy markets of European Union member states.  Current 
European Union legislation and decisions reflects such an approach and measures for 
unbundling and coordinated regulation are underway (EUR-Lex, 2010).  The European 
Union has traditionally used economic and market related tools to deepen European 
integration, even when negotiations are politically sensitive.  Member states have benefitted 
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from economic unification, but much work remains to be done at the European Union level.  
Collective measures were possible for controlling green house gas emissions because every 
member state experiences the effects of climate change.  Current conditions are not optimal 
for supranational cooperation in energy policies beyond climate change, as demonstrated by 
the examples of natural gas and oil, because of the diversity of national energy portfolios and 
interests.  This policy area is especially difficult to develop as market mechanisms are only a 
part of the energy policy picture and national preferences are divided among the member 
states.  Aspects of foreign policy must be included in order to address the politically sensitive 
nature of energy security, further complicating negotiations.  Within an institutional context, 
possible outcomes are limited by economic and political factors, and the procedures and 
norms of the decision making process. The informal practice of consensus building and 
unanimity, even when qualified majority voting can be used in policy areas, means that 
preferences must converge in some way before a new agenda or policy is politically viable at 
the supranational level.  Although the energy landscape is economically and politically 
complex, the European Union is still a forum for policy discussion and member states can 
still be rallied around common interests – such as the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions 
by 20 percent by 2020.   
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Taken from Le Coq and Paltseva, 2009.    
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